

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Korea REPORT 25X1

SUBJECT New Views of North Korean Army and Government Personnel on Unification of Korea DATE DISTR. 18 March 1955 25X1

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REFERENCES

This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. The lowest-ranking Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and North Korean Army personnel were convinced there would never be another war between North and South Korea. They recognized South Korea as an independent state. The majority of high-ranking officials in North Korea, who were 20 to 30 years old,¹ were of the opinion, too, that the ideas of the older generation are outmoded and their policies obsolete.² The officials felt that although North and South Korea had been enemies, conditions warranted mutual respect and trade unification. While the past approach had been to spread the slogan, "Down with the power of Syngman RHEE!" they have come to accept RHEE's position and advocate mutual assistance. They maintained that to cling to outworn policies is to retrogress. The young officials contended that this new approach should not be considered inconsistent or the result of pressure by a stronger power. They maintained that it is a progressive, constructive, and healthy move consistent with the present international situation. They asserted that anyone, including the chief of the MIA himself, who ridiculed this sudden change in policy would be backward in his thinking. To demonstrate the validity of the new policy they pointed out that since the international situation precluded the unification of Korea by force, they were appealing to South Korea to unify the country by peaceful means. Propaganda slogans posted around Songjin (N 40-40, E 129-12) (EAL701) were either those hailing MAO Tse-tung, KIM Il-song, and Malenkov, or those dealing with economic recovery, such as, "Fight for the Success of the Economic Plan!" and "Unify the South Korean Economy!" There were none denouncing the United States as imperialistic or branding Syngman RHEE as a puppet.

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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC					
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2.

1. Comment. KIM Il-song, who claims to represent the younger element, will probably demonstrate leadership by exhibiting to ROK citizens the reconstructed roads, buildings, and bridges of P'yongyang. In order to ease the manpower shortage he will probably attempt to lure ROK citizens into North Korea by not mentioning the ideological problem for some time. Accordingly, in order to publicize the idea that the Government exists for the benefit of the people and that the North Korean officials are considerate of the public welfare, dishonesty in public office is being stringently controlled, the rights of the individual are being accorded increased respect, luxury is condoned, and restrictions on black-marketeering have been lifted.

Comments

2. Reference here is evidently to the older belief that war for the unification of Korea remains inevitable.

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4. Possibly Sinch'On is meant, as reports cited in Comment #5 refer to Sinch'On as being a monazite mining area.

5. [redacted] mining ore was sent to USSR 25X1
[redacted] to pay for the military aid received prior to and during the 25X1
Korean war. [redacted] 25X1

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